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CONFLICT OF LAWS -

TORT CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES Ap

Cohen v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E. 2d 581 (1983).
PLIED TO A BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIM IN

I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent Massachusetts decision has apparently given the courts
of that commonwealth the option not to apply Massachusetts law to
occurrences bearing an appropriate relation to the commonwealth.
In Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts accepted certification2 of three principal ques
tions of law from the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. 3 The court specifically considered the applicable law
with respect to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim for breach of
warranty and negligence. 4 This note focuses on the court's analysis of
applicable law in a decision that treats what is essentially a tort issue
as a choice-of-law problem. 5 The court's choice-of-law resolution ren
ders future litigation less predictable than litigation of the past.
II.

A.

COHEN

Facts

Nellie Cohen, the deceased, had resided in Massachusetts. She
I. 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).
2. The supreme judicial court may accept questions certified to it by a federal district
court pursuant to section I of S.J.C. Rule 1:03, which provides:
This court may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court
of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, or of the District of
Columbia, or a United States District Court, or the highest appellate court of any
other state when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any
proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of
the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the
certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this court.
SUP. JUD. COURT RULE 1:03 § I (West 1981).
3. The three principal questions certified to the supreme judicial court involve breach
of warranty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and applicable law. Cohen, 389
Mass. at 328, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
4. Id. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
5. In Cohen, the court recognized that the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was the direct result of an alleged breach of warranty and it concluded
that "it is appropriate to view the choice of law issues raised by the plaintiff's claim in light
of choice of law principles applicable in tort actions." Id. at 333, 450 N.E.2d at 584.
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had two sons: the plaintiff, Manuel Cohen, a resident of California;
and Ira Cohen, deceased, who had been a resident of Illinois. 6 Ira
Cohen was killed in an airplane crash near Chicago, Illinois, while
flying to Los Angeles, California. 7 The airplane was manufactured by
McDonnell Douglas Corporation and was operated by American Air
lines Corporation, both defendants in this action. 8
The plaintiff telephoned his mother in Massachusetts from his
home in California approximately seven hours after the accident to
inform her of Ira's death. 9 Upon learning of the death of her son,
Nellie Cohen suffered a series of angina attacks and died of a subse
quent heart attack.lO
The plaintiff, the executor of Nellie Cohen's estate, was her only
surviving heir and next of kin. II He instigated an action on behalf of
his mother's estate against McDonnell Douglas Corporation for
breach of warranty.u American Airlines Corporation, the first de
fendant, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in New York.13 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, the second defend
ant, is a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in
Missouri. 14
6.

Id. at 329, 450 N.E.2d at 582-83.
Id. at 329, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
On May 25, 1979, at approximately 3 p.m., CDT, while civil aircraft NIIOA
was operating on a regularly scheduled flight, designated American Airlines
Flight 191, from Chicago, Illinois, to Los Angeles, California, and as NllOA was
in the process of taking off from Runway 32 R at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illi
nois, the left engine of said civil aircraft separated from the airframe and fell to
the ground. As the direct and proximate result thereof, civil aircraft NIIOA
crashed.
Appendix to Brief for Defendant at 6 (citing complaint at 3), Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 389 Mass. 327,450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).
8. Id. at 329, 450 N.E.2d at 582-83. This note considers the plaintiff's claim against
McDonnell Douglas Corporation for breach of warranty.
9. Id. at 329, 450 N.E.2d at 583. "The plaintiff, Ira's brother, learned of the accident
while listening to a radio broadcast and surmised that his brother had been a passenger on
the aircraft involved." Id.
10. Id. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583. The defendant asserted that Nellie Cohen had
suffered from angina attacks for twelve years prior to her death and that she had taken
medication for her condition. Appellate Brieffor Defendant at 5 n.3, Cohen v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327,450 N.E.2d 581 (1983). For purposes of the motions for
summary judgment, however, the trial court assumed that Nellie's heart attack and subse
quent death were the direct results of her emotional response to the news of her son's death.
Cohen, 389 Mass. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
11. 389 Mass. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
7.

CHOICE OF LAW
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Decision

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts accepted the dis
trict court's certified questions of law and applied choice-of-Iaw rules
that govern tort claims to the plaintiff's breach of warranty claim. IS
The court then concluded that Massachusetts law l6 controlled the
15. Id. at 332-33, 450 N.E.2d at 584. Rather than treat the plaintiff's claim as a
contract claim, the court treated it as a tort; specifically the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress:
Clearly a state's interest in enforcing warranties involves not only the physi
cal presence of a product within a State but also the injury caused within a State
by that product. Thus, it is appropriate in this case to examine tort choice of law
pricniples in deciding whether the law of Massachusetts applies to the plaintiff's
breach of warranty claim.
389 Mass. at 333, 450 N.E.2d at 585. A claim for the wrongful death of Ira Cohen was
pending in Illinois at the time of this writing. The Illinois court presumably applied Illinois
law to that claim. Id. at 329 n.2, 450 N.E.2d at 583 n.2. Although the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts had previously recognized that "a claim for breach of warranty of
merchantability is in essence a tort claim," that shift of focus from contract to tort came in
a contribution case which was silent on extending such application to choice-of-law resolu
tion. Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass. 95, 99, 434 N.E.2d 1008, lOll (1982). See infra
text accompanying notes 55-61.
16. As a practical matter the plaintiff would have benefited from the application of
Massachusetts law with respect to the breach of warranty claim because the applicable
statute provides for punitive damages. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1958)
provides in pertinent part:
A person who (I) by his negligence causes the death of a person, or (2) by
willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person under such circum
stances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if
his death had not resulted . . . or (5) is responsible for a breach of warranty
arising under Article 2 of chapter one hundred and six which results in injury to a
person that causes death, shall be liable in damages in the amount of: (I) the fair
monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the dam
ages. . . . (3) punitive damages in an amount of not less than five thousand
dollars. . . .
Id. (emphasis added). Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § I (West 1959):
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corpo
ration which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an
action for damages, not withstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in
law to felony.
Id. A problem with the application of Massachusetts law to the plaintiff's claim is the
inconsistent and illogical result of having the laws of different states apply to the claims of
the estates of Ira and Nellie Cohen. The defendant asserted that the court should analogize
this case to loss of consortium cases in which a spouse's claim is parasitic to a physical
injury claim. The defendant then argued that the law of the state that governs the duty of
care toward Ira Cohen should similarly govern the duty of care toward his relatives who
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plaintiff's breach of warranty claim 17 and that tort choice-of-Iaw
principles must apply because the alleged breach of warranty was
merely an extension of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. IS
III.

ANALYSIS

The court's analysis of applicable law with respect to the plain
tiff's claim converts what is labeled a "tort claim"19 into a choice-of
law issue. The problem with the court's analysis in Cohen is threefold.
First, the court approached the issue as a choice-of-Iaw problem even
though no conflict of laws existed. Second, the court abandoned the
certainty of result available by statute. 20 Third, the court relied on an
erroneous interpretation of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws,21
Although The Cohen dispute involved the potential interests of
seven states,22 the conflict of laws issue lacked substance. 23 The court
were at most only indirectly affected by the crash. This argument was rejected by the
court. 389 Mass. at 334-35, 450 N.E.2d at 585.
The net result of the application of Massachusetts law, therefore, would allow the
estate of Nellie Cohen, if successful, to recover punitive damages while Illinois law would
bar recovery of punitive damages for the death of Ira Cohen, the true "recipient" of the
alleged wrongful conduct. Appellate Brief for Defendant at 20, Cohen v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327,450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).
17. "On the record submitted to the court in this case, we conclude that no other
State, including Illinois, appears to have a more significant interest in the plaintiffs claim
than that of Massachusetts." 389 Mass. at 336, 450 N.E.2d at 586. See also id. at 344, 450
N.E.2d at 590. "[W]e conclude that the law of Massachusetts applies to both the plaintiffs
breach of warranty and negligence claims and that, under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover damages under either of these theories." Id.
18. 389 Mass. at 333, 450 N.E.2d at 584. The Cohen court used the terms breach of
warranty and negligent infliction oj emotional distress interchangeably.
19. 389 Mass. at 332, 450 N.E.2d at 584.
20. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 1-105 (West 1958) provides:
When a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to an
other state or nation the parties may agree that the law in either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agree
ment this chapter applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this
state.
Id. Although the U.C.c. standard is ambiguous, its application provides a certain result
because jurisdiction appears to satisfy the requisite "appropriate relation."
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
22. The seven states interested in the dispute were Massachusetts, Illinois, Califor
nia, Maryland, Missouri, Delaware, and New York. Cohen, 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d
581 (1983).
23. Id. at 332 n.7, 450 N.E.2d at 583 n.7. "Rather than opine about the law of the
several States, we assume, for the purpose of responding to the Federal District Court
judge's certified questions, that there is indeed a conflict of laws." Id.
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expressly considered the interests of two of those states: Massachu
setts, the state in which Nellie Cohen died; and Illinois, the situs of the
airplane crash that killed Ira Cohen. 24 As a practical matter, resolu
tion as to which state's law applied to the plaintiff's negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim was unnecessary because the application of
general tort law principles would render an identical result regardless
of which state's law was used: the plaintiff would be denied recovery.25
In fact, upon concluding that Massachusetts law applied to the plain
tiff's complaint,26 the court maintained that recovery must be de
nied. 27 The plaintiff contended that recovery should be allowed
because the physical injury to Nellie Cohen was reasonably foresee
able. 28 The court deduced that the plaintiff's interpretation of the Mas
sachusetts Uniform Commercial Code, if accepted, would result in
substantial expansion of liability for the negligent infliction of emo
24. Id. at 333-34, 450 N.E.2d at 585. This note examines the suit brought by Manuel
Cohen as the executor of his mother's estate in Massachusetts.
25. Application of general principles of tort law of the seven interested states renders
identical results. In Massachusetts, relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress is
granted to a parent when he or she either witnesses an accident involving his or her child,
or soon comes on the scene while the injured child is still there. Dziokonski v. Babineau,
375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). In the absence of direct physical impact, relief is
granted in Illinois only if there is a contemporaneous observance of the accident. Rickey v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 101 Ill. App.3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981); Kaiserman v.
Bright, 61 Ill. App.3d 67,377 N.E.2d 261 (1978). Maryland allows a parent to maintain an
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of physical impact if the
defendant's negligent act or omission results in some clearly apparent and substantial phys
ical injury. Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979); H & R Block, Inc. v.
Festerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A.
182 (1933). In Mississippi, such damages may be recovered when they are the natural
result of an act committed intentionally or with such gross carelessness or recklessness as to
show an utter indifference to the consequences. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261
So.2d 481 (Miss. 1972). In Delaware, claims for mental suffering are of questionable valid
ity if the plaintiff was, in fact, outside of the zone of danger. Farrall v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 457 A.2d 763 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983); Mancino v. Webb, 274 A.2d 711 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965). New York
extends liability in favor of those directly or intentionally harmed in Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). Finally, in California, liability is
exended for the negligent infliction of emotional distress if the plaintiff establishes that the
harm was reasonably foreseeable, the plaintiff was in the zone of danger or observed the
occurrence contemporaneously, and the plaintiff was closely related to the victim. Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.Rept. 72 (1968). Cohen's claim failed to satisfy
the requirements in all seven states.
26. Cohen, 389 Mass. at 337, 450 N.E.2d at 586.
27. Id. at 338-39, 450 N.E.2d at 587-88.
28. Id. Plaintiff asserted that a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
could prevail based on the language of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West
1958). See infra note 42.
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tional distress. 29
A. Avoiding Choice-ol-Law
Circumstances that present no conflict of laws because the laws of
the interested states are in accord permit the court to ignore the
choice-of-Iaw issue. For instance, in In re Pioneer Ford Sales. Inc.,30
the court of appeals avoided consideration of a "conflicts" question in
a bankruptcy case because the petitioner did not persuade it that
Michigan law differed in any relevant respect from the law of Rhode
Island. 3l Similarly, the second circuit concluded in Walter E. Heller
& Co. v. Video Innovations 32 that the lower court's application of New
York law rather than the law of Illinois was not a proper ground for
reversal, finding that "there is no material difference between the law
of New York and the law of Illinois."33 Although Pioneer Ford Sales
and Video Innovations both post-date Cohen, the procedure whereby a
court permits itself to pass on choice-of-Iaw pre-dates the Cohen deci
sion. 34 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, therefore, could
have acceptably concluded that the district court need not have deter
mined applicable law. Manuel Cohen could not recover against Mc
Donnell Douglas Corporation for negligent infliction of emotional
distress regardless of which state's law was applied. 3s The court could
have merely denied the plaintiff recovery and omitted its analysis of
applicable law. 36
29.
stating:

389 Mass. at 338, 450 N.E.2d at 587. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument,

We think that the Legislature . . . did not intend that recovery be allowed in
all cases where a plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable. Rather. . . it is
consistent with legislative intent that the scope of liability extend no further than
the scope of liability under the common law action for negligent infliction of emo
tional distress.
Id. at 339, 450 N.E.2d at 588.
30. 729 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984).
31. Id. at 31. Specifically the court of appeals stated:
First, Ford notes that the franchise contract says that Michigan law governs.
We thus cannot be certain that Rhode Island provides the relevant non
bankruptcy law without deciding whether its 'dealer protection' policies are suffi
ciently strong to overcome the contract's 'choice of law' provision as applied in a
diversity case brought in a Rhode Island federal court. . . . We avoid this 'con
flicts' question, however. For one thing, we have no reason to believe that Michi
gan law differs in any relevant respect.
Id. (emphasis added).
32. 730 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 53.
34. E.g., National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
35. See supra note 25.
36. The laws of the seven interested states in the Cohen dispute are in accord with
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Abandoning the certainty of result under the U. C. C.

Assuming arguendo that a choice-of-Iaw question deserving the
court's consideration did exist, a proper starting point for the court's
analysis would have been statutory interpretation. 37 Section 1-105 of
the Uniform Commercial Code represents a rare example of a legisla
tive instruction to the courts on the law; the issue is relevant to Co
hen. 38 Section 1-105 provides virtual certainty of result because it
requires merely that a transaction or occurrence bear an appropriate
relation to a state before that state's law is applied, absent a specific
agreement to the contrary made by the parties invo1ved. 39 The Cohen
court possessed an unparalleled opportunity because Massachusetts
had not previously defined "appropriate relation" in a choice-of-Iaw
case brought under the Uniform Commercial Code.40 The court rec
ognized that previous decisions had left the term ambiguous. 41 In its
determination that Massachusetts law applied to Cohen's breach of
warranty claim, however, the court failed to define the term expressly.
While one can reasonably argue that the term "appropriate relation"
is ambiguous, it does continue to provide virtual certainty of result
because the test appears to be satisfied by minimal contact between a
transaction or occurrence and the forum state.
The plaintiff based his breach of warranty claim on § 2-318 of the
respect to liability. The application of Massachusetts law as compared to the law of Illi
nois, California, Maryland, Missouri, Delaware, or New York would have benefited the
plaintiff to the extent that punitive damages would be included in the award only if the
plaintiff were allowed to recover. See supra notes 16 and 25.
37. The Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code contains a statutory directive
which the courts must follow in analyzing choice of law. See supra note 20 and accompa
nying text.
38. Id.
39. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 1-105 (West 1958).
40. 389 Mass. at 331, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
41. Id. Although the court found the term "appropriate relation" ambiguous, it had
previously encountered no problem implementing that standard. See. e.g., Nevins v.
Tinker, 384 Mass. 702, 704-05, 429 N.E.2d 332, 334 (1981). "Since the note in question is
a negotiable instrument as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code . . . conflict of law
problems pertaining to it are resolved by the Code. Where the transaction bears an 'appro
priate relation' to Massachusetts. . . the laws of the Commonwealth govern." Id.; Indus
trial Bank of Rhode Island v. Leo's Used Car Exch., 362 Mass. 797, 800, 291 N.E.2d 603,
605 (1973). "Conflict of law problems arising under the Uniform Commercial Code are
resolved by the Code . . . [s]ince there is no evidence that the parties agreed that a particu
lar state's law would apply, and since the transaction bears an appropriate relation to this
state, Massachusetts law applies." Id.; and Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, 345 Mass.
429, 432, 187 N.E.2d 669, 671 (1963). "There is no finding that the parties agreed that the
Connecticut law should apply. The transaction bore an appropriate relation to this state.
The contract of sale was executed here and the plane was delivered to the plaintiffs here."
Id.
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Uniform Commercial Code. 42 The court had decided previously that
conflict of law problems arising out of the Uniform Commercial Code
would be resolved by the Code43 and that in the absence of an agree
ment between the parties as to which state's law would govern, "the
provisions of the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code shall ap
ply to 'transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. '''44
As the court noted, the parties never agreed to the application of a
specific state's law to a possible breach of warranty claim.45 There
fore, the resolution of the choice-of-Iaw issue was dependent on the
interpretation of the term "appropriate relation."46 Based on the
above cited Code provisions, and assuming that a conflict of laws did
exist, the airplane crash bore an appropriate relation to Massachusetts
and, therefore, by the court's own analysis, Massachusetts law should
have been applied under the statutory directive detailed in § 1-105. 47
Jurisdiction over the dispute appears to satisfy the appropriate relation
requirement. 48 Under the legislative directive of the Uniform Com
mercial Code § 1-105, therefore, the court could have applied Massa
chusetts law. The court instead rejected the U.C.c. analysis by
labelling the plaintiffs breach of warranty claim a tort.49
C.

Choice-ol-Law under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

Rather than conclude its analysis of applicable law with the legis
lative directive of § 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Co
hen court abandoned the virtual certainty of result available and
42. 389 Mass. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318
(West 1958) mandates in part:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer . . . to recover damages for breach of
warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not
purchase the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person whom the
manufacturer . . . might reasonably have expected to . . . be affected by the
goods. The manufacturer . . . may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section. . . .
Id.
43. 389 Mass. at 330-31,450 N.E.2d at 583.
44. Id. at 331, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
45. Id. The plaintiff, in fact, had no previous contact with the defendant. Further
more, Massachusetts had no connection to the allgedly defective product; its only relation·
ship to the case was the fact that Nellie Cohen died there. Appellate Brief for Defendant at
11, Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327,450 N.E.2d 5810983).
46. 389 Mass. at 331, 450 N .E.2d at 583.
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § I-lOS (West 1958 & Supp. 1984-85).
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
49. 389 Mass. at 333, 450 N.E.2d at 584. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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turned to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. so
The Restatement specifically addresses situations in which tortious
conduct occurs in one state and injury occurs in another. s1 The
court's interpretation of and reliance on the Restatement are errone
ous for two reasons: First, the court mislabelled the plaintitrs breach
of warranty claim;52 and second, the court neglected to address Re
statement § 653 in its analysis.
The court concluded that to label the plaintitrs breach of war
ranty claim a tort 54 was consistent with its holding in Wolfe v. Ford
Motor Co. 55 Wolfe was a contribution case in which the court con
cluded that a breach of warranty should be treated as a tort. 56
Although Wolfe was devoid of a choice-of-Iaw issue, the Cohen court
determined that the Wolfe analysis applied and that the Cohen conflict
issue should be treated as a tort. 57 This extension of the Wolfe analysis
unnecessarily subjected Cohen to the fallacy of the transplanted cate
gory,58 described as being "much like the old argumentative trick of
using a word in two different senses. But in the context of any fairly
complex legal problem its spurious conclusions can be made to seem
very plausible."59 The court's error lay, therefore, in concluding that
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
51. 389 Mass. at 336, 450 N.E.2d at 586.
52. Id. at 333, 450 N.E.2d at 584.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
54. 389 Mass. at 332-33, 450 N.E.2d at 584.
55. 386 Mass. at 95, 434 N.E.2d 1008 (1982).
56. 386 Mass. at 98, 434 N.E.2d at 1010. The court in Wolfe framed the issue as
"whether. . . a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, should be read to embrace
liability for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability." Id.
57. 389 Mass. at 333, 45 N.E.2d at 585. In effect, the court concluded that the defi
nition and analysis of breach of warranty in a contribution case must be applied in the
entirely different context of a choice-of-law case.
58. The fallacy of the transplanted category is an assumption that a defined term
retains its meaning regardless of the context in which it is used. Both medical and legal
writing have been criticized for falling into the pattern of the fallacy. See Cook, "Sub
stance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict ofLaws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1983). Professor Cook
observes:
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal
rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have
precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has
the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against. We find ex
amples of it wherever we turn.
Id. at 337.
59. Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REV. 535, 536
(1959).
The fallacy of the transplanted category is not just another erroneous theory
of law (like the meeting of the minds theory of contract) which can be contro
verted by a demonstration that it produces undesirable results or cannot be recon
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the choice-of-law aspect of Cohen's breach of warranty claim was a
tort merely because the court previously so labelled the contribution
aspect of a previous case. 6O The concept that principles applicable to
tort law likewise apply to the law of contribution is fairly well devel
oped. 6 \ Such application to choice-of-Iaw principles, however, is not
well developed. In fact, § 1-105 appears to be at odds with principles
of tort law. Although tort principles provide clarity in select contribu
tion cases, they cloud choice-of-Iaw analysis considered in depth by
the V.C.C.
The Cohen court relied on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON
FLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) in its determination of applicable law:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with re
spect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occur
rence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their rela
tive importance with respect to the particular issue. 62

It failed, however, to address RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
ciled with the cases. It is a basic bad habit of legal thinking for which we all
receive preparatory training from childhood onward. Critical writing may allevi
ate its influence in particular instances but the novel opportunities for its applica
tion, especially in the construction of statutes, are virtually unlimited.
Id. at 574-75.
60. Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass. 95, 434 N.E.2d 1008 (1982).
61. See id.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (emphasis ad
ded). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 comment e (1971)
which states:
The local law of the state where the personal injury occurred is most likely to
be applied when the injured person has a settled relationship to that state, either
because he is domiciled or resides there or because he does business there. When,
however, the injured person is domiciled or resides or does business in the state
where the conduct occurred, there is a greater likelihood that this state is to be
the state of the most significant relationship and therefore the state of the applica
ble law with respect to issues that would usually be determined by the local law of
the state of injury.
Id.
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§ 6 (1971) which states that the court, subject to Constitu
tional restrictions, will follow the statutory directives of its own
state. 63 The Restatement comment specifically states that "[a]n exam
ple of a statute directed to choice of law is the Uniform Commercial
Code which provides in certain instances for the application of the law
chosen by the parties (§ 1-105 (1» and in other instances for the appli
cation of the law of a particular state. . . . "64 A proper reading and
application of the Restatement, therefore, directs one's attention back
to the logical starting point: statutory interpretation of § 1-105.
The court did concede that "[u]nder the Restatement approach,
Massachusetts law would apply in this case because Nellie Cohen, a
resident of Massachusetts, was injured and died in Massachusetts."65
The court came to this conclusion after side-stepping the ambiguous
"most significant relationship" requirement imposed by § 145,66 and
ignoring the statutory directive detailed in § 667 which would have di
rected the court's attention to the V.C.C. and the "appropriate rela
tion" standard. 68 As discussed above, the appropriate relation
standard in the u.C.C. is less stringent than the "most significant re
lation" standard in the Restatement. 69 Apparently, a state bears an
appropriate relation to a dispute merely by satisfying jurisdictional
requirements.70
OF LAWS

63.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory di
rective of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relevant interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(t) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. (emphasis added). Such a directive is obviously circular because it reverts attention to
the U.C.C. analysis discussed supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
64. Id. at Comment a.
65. Although the court concluded that Massachusetts law applied to serve the inter
ests of its injured resident (the estate of Nellie Cohen), the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover under Massachusetts law. 389 Mass. at 336, 450 N.E.2d at 586.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.
68. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
69. See supra text accompanying note 48.
70. Id.
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ALTERNATIVES

Assuming that a true conflict of laws existed in the Cohen dis
pute, alternative approaches to its resolution were available. The Co
hen court recognized the modern trend in choice-of-Iaw resolution
toward an interest analysis approach,7! deviating from the once uni
versally accepted lex loci delicti (law of the place of the tort)
doctrine.72
A.

Balance of State Interests

One alternative available to the court was to balance the identifi
able interests between the two principal states, Massachusetts and Illi
nois. Such a balance may have revealed that Illinois, the place of the
tort, had a greater interest in the resolution of the Cohen dispute.
While Massachusetts maintains a recognizable and legitimate interest
in protecting its residents,73 the application of Massachusetts law did
little to protect the plaintiffs interests because recovery was denied. 74
Illinois appears to have borne the most substantial interest in the out
come of Cohen because Illinois had a more weighty nexus to the acci
dent in that the plane crashed in that state as well as in that Ira Cohen
presumably purchased his ticket and boarded the plane there. 75
It is by no means a unique idea to apply the laws of the state in
which the accident occurred. In Schulhof v. Northeast Cellulose,
71. Although the Cohen court did not expressly adopt an interest analysis approach,
it did consider the interests of both Massachusetts and Illinois. Cohen, 389 Mass. 327, 450
N.E.2d 581 (1983). For a discussion of interest analysis in choice-of-law see Egnal, The
"Essential" Role of Modern Renvoi in the Governmental Interest Analysis Approach to
Choice of Law, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 237 (1981). "When choice of law issues arise in a forum
which uses interest analysis, the forum court must consider the interests of the 'other' state
as well as those of its own state." Id. at 247.
72. Egnal, supra note 71 at 237.
73. Cj Id. at 266, n.125.
A state's interest in applying its plaintiff-protecting rule has been found in
the state's desire to deter wrongful conduct either within its borders or by its
citizens outside its borders. In addition, a jurisdiction's general altruistic sympa
thies can create an interest in protecting a plaintiff regardless of his contacts with
that state.
Id.
74. 389 Mass. at 329, 450 N.E.2d at 582.
75. "[It cannot] reasonably be argued that the place of the accident in the present
case was fortuitous or 'irrelevant.' . . . Indeed, if anything in this case was fortuitous, it
was that the mother of one of the passengers on that flight happened to live in Massachu
setts." Reply Brief for Defendant at 7, Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass.
327,450 N.E.2d 581 (1983). Furthermore, application of Illinois law would promote the
interests of the public, operators, and manufacturers by the application of uniform rules to
an aircrash of this nature. Id. at II.
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Inc. ,76 the district court applied Massachusetts law to a suit that arose
out of an aircraft collision and stated, "[t]he collision between the two
aircraft occurred over Gardner, Massachusetts. That fact, in itself,
points strongly to Massachusetts tort law."77 It would, therefore, have
been consistent with the district court's rationale in Schulhof for the
supreme judicial court to apply Illinois law to Cohen's claim because
the accident occurred in Illinois. Massachusetts precedent strongly
supports the application of the laws of the state in which the accident
occurred. In Schulhof, for instance, the court maintained that rules of
the air should ordinarily be determined by reference to the law of the
state in which the air is located. 78 In Pevoski v. Pevoski,79 furthermore,
the court concluded that "where the place of injury is not also the
place in which the accident occurred, its significance is greatly dimin
ished. It is the place of the accident which is crucial to liability is
sues."80 Upon finding it necessary to treat Cohen's "tort" claim as a
choice-of-Iaw problem, the supreme judicial court could have con
cluded, consistent with precedent, that the law of Illinois should have
governed the plaintiff's claim.
Additional support for the application of Illinois law, in the pres
ence of a conflict of laws, is found in Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply,
Ltd. 8l The fact pattern that led to the dispute in Kelley is remarkably
similar to that in Cohen. In Kelley, however, the court concluded that
the laws of the state in which the accident occurred, rather than the
laws of the state in which the plaintiff's decedent learned of the death
of his daughter and suffered a fatal heart attack, controlled the plain
tiff's emotional distress claim. 82 Despite the factual similarity to Co
hen, the supreme judicial court recognized Kelley merely as support
for its denial of the plaintiff's recovery,83 and failed to consider the
76. 545 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Mass. 1982).
77. Id. at 1204.
78. Id. at 1205. See a/so, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981), in which the Seventh Circuit concluded that Illinois
had a substantial interest in preventing aircraft disasters and protecting persons and busi
nesses within its borders. Id. at 615-16.
79. 371 Mass. 359, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976).
80. Id. at 359, 358 N.E.2d at 417. In Pevoski, the court determined that another
state's law should be applied only when the impact of a particular resolution clearly falls
upon a state other than the accident situs and would have no real effect upon any other
state's interest. Id. The Cohen court failed, however, to challenge expressly its rationale in
Pevoski. Cohen, 389 Mass. at 333, 450 N.E.2d at 585.
81. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
82. Id. In Kelley, the court applied the laws of Hawaii rather than the laws of Cali
fornia. Id. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676-77.
83. The Cohen court stated:
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choice-of-Iaw alternative suggested and applied by the Supreme Court
of Hawaii.
B.

Appropriate Relation Under the U. C. C.

A second alternative available to the court involved the applica
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105,84 not previously inter
preted by the courts of Massachusetts. 8s The Cohen court abandoned
§ 1-105 and the "appropriate relation" standard because it was ambig
UOUS,86 and instead applied the Restatement's "most significant rela
tionship" standard. 87 The following alteration of the facts that led to
the Cohen dispute help to illustrate that the most significant relation
ship standard is more ambiguous than the appropriate relation stan
dard. Suppose that Nellie Cohen, a resident of Massachusetts, was
vacationing in Maine when she received the phone call informing her
of her son's death. Had she died in Maine, or even in New Hampshire
while en route back to Massachusetts, Massachusetts' "most signifi
cant relation" would appear to dissolve under the Cohen court's ra
tionale. Even though Nellie remained a resident of Massachusetts, her
death in another state would affect the court's choice-of-Iaw determi
nation because the court considers the place of her death a dominant
factor in its analysis. 88 The result reached by the court with the appli
cation of the Restatement,89 therefore, would be altered. Nellie's
death in Maine or New Hampshire would likely shift the "most signifi
cant relationship" away from Massachusetts. Massachusetts would,
however, maintain its "appropriate relation" to the dispute because it
is the forum state and the deceased's former place of residence. Even
though the term "appropriate relation" in § 1-105 is ambiguous,
We are aware of no case where a court has imposed liability where the plain
tiff was located a substantial distance from the scene of the accident and did not
observe either the scene of the accident or injuries inflicted on the victim. . . .
Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 206 (1975) (dismissing
claim on behalf of estate of father and grandfather of decedents, for emotional
distress which he suffered while in California after being informed by means of a
telephone call of deaths in Hawaii).
389 Mass. at 342, 450 N.E.2d at 589.
84. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 16, § 1-105(1) (1958 & West Supp. 1984). See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
85. Cohen, 389 Mass. at 331,450 N.E.2d at 583.
86. Id. at 332-33, 450 N.E.2d at 584.
87. Id. at 336, 450 N.E.2d at 586. The court determined that under the Restatement
approach Massachusetts law would apply because the plaintiff, a resident of Massachusetts,
was injured and died in that state. Id.
88. 389 Mass. at 336-37, 450 N.E.2d at 586-87.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
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courts have traditionally had no difficulty with its application. Virtu
ally every court previously confronted with § 1-105 has found an ap
propriate relation. 90 Jurisdiction over the dispute appears to satisfy
the appropriate relation requirement. Therefore, all seven states91
having a connection to the Cohen dispute had an appropriate relation
for choice-of-Iaw purposes. The net result of § 1-105 is the application
of the law of the forum state. Assuming that a conflict of laws existed,
the court could have concluded that Massachusetts bore an appropri
ate relation to the dispute by satisfying the requirements for jurisdic
tion. Because Massachusetts law was applicable via the appropriate
relation standard, the court unnecessarily complicated the choice-of
law analysis with the most significant relationship standard.
V.

CONCLUSION

The court's analysis in Cohen founders on its erroneous interpre
tation and application of choice-of-Iaw principles. First, choice-of-Iaw
analysis was not necessary in Cohen because the interested states
maintain virtually identical laws which would have rendered the same
result with respect to the plaintiff's claim in any state. Second, assum
ing that a choice-of-Iaw analysis was necessary, the court should have
applied the Uniform Commercial Code's directive that the forum
state's law applied to the complaint. The U.c.c. approach would
have eliminated the legal masquerade that characterized the rationali
zation behind the application of the forum state's laws in Cohen.
Third, proper interpretation of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON
FLICT OF LAWS (1971), to which the court next turned, would have
directed the court back to the certainty of result under the U.C.C.
Alternatives existed consistent with the Cohen court's conclusion
that a conflict of laws necessitated a choice of law. Rather than con
cluding that Massachusetts law applied to the plaintiff's claim, how
ever, the court could have reasonably concluded that Illinois law
applied because Illinois possessed a greater interest in the settlement of
the dispute. Although the lex loci approach does not always serve the
interests of the forum state, the application of the law of the place of
the accident in Cohen would have yielded the same result, and would
90. Despite the ambiguity of the term, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
found an "appropriate relation" when confronted with § I-lOS in Nevin v. Tinker, 384
Mass. 702, 429 N.E.2d 332 (1981); Industrial Bank of Rhode Island v. Leo's Used Car
Exch., 362 Mass. 797, 729 N.E.2d 603 (1973); and Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, 345
Mass. 427, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963).
91. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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also have served the interests of the state possessing the most substan
tial connection to the accident, Illinois.
In conclusion, future litigation over choice-of-Iaw cases in which
the meaning of "appropriate relation" is an issue was made more un
predictable by Cohen. By abandoning the clarity of result available by
the application of legislative dictum, the supreme judicial court af
forded the courts of Massachusetts the option not to apply Massachu
setts law to occurrences that bear an appropriate relation to the
Commonwealth. Trial courts may ignore applicable law under the ap
propriate relation standard of the V.C.c. and turn to a more stringent
test, the most significant relationship standard promulgated by the
Restatement.
Kirby G. Huget

